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Abstract
This paper presents new formulae for the valuation of convertible
debt and shows how it can be rational for convertible holders to con-
vert not only when the debtor’s equity value increases, but also when
the debtor approaches distress. "Conversion in distress" can avert costly
bankruptcy even when debt cannot be renegotiated. If bankruptcy costs
are high, neglecting "conversioni nd i s t r e s s "m a ye n t a i las i g n i ﬁcant un-
dervaluationofsubordinatedconvertibles. "Conversionindistress"makes
convertible debt less sensitive than non-convertible debt to the recovery
value of assets in bankruptcy. So convertible ﬁnancing can reduce the
cost of borrowing when lenders are asymmetrically informed about the
debtor’s assets recovery value.
Key words: subordinated convertible debt, default, bankruptcy costs,
" c o n v e r s i o ni nd i s t r e s s " .
JEL classiﬁcation: G13;G33.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper analyses the valuation of convertible subordinated debt in the presence of
bankruptcy costs when debt renegotiation is not possible, as may be the case for pub-
licly traded convertible bonds. This issue is of interest since the volume of outstand-
1ing convertible bonds has grown dramatically since the middle 1990’s, while the gen-
eral creditworthiness of such bonds has signiﬁcantly decreased. The increased default
risk of convertibles is coupled with very high recovery risk since most convertibles are
subordinated and the potential bankruptcy costs of convertibles issuers are often high
(Moody’s Investors Service (2001)).
The literature of structural models or contingent claims analysis has generally val-
ued convertibles without recognising that, especially in the presence of bankruptcy
costs, the convertible may be worth converting not only when the debtor’s equity value
rises, but also when the debtor approaches distress. So this paper derives new closed
formsolutions forthevaluation ofsubordinatedconvertibledebt whichshowtheimpact
of"conversionindistress"onthevalueofaconvertible. Thereasonforconvertingwhen
the debtor is in the proximity of distress is that conversion reduces the debtor’s leverage
and may thus avert default and costly bankruptcy. In addition, due to bankruptcy costs
or to the subordination covenant, the recovery value in bankruptcy of the non-converted
convertible may well be below the value of the fraction of equity into which convert-
ible holders have the right to convert. This argument is particularly important when
the convertible is subordinated and entails that ignoring the possibility to convert "in
distress" may lead to a signiﬁcant undervaluation of low grade convertibles, especially
when bankruptcy costs are high and when the convertible is very "equity like", ie. when
convertible holders receive a large fraction of equity upon conversion. Moreover, the
conversion option can increase the bargaining power of subordinated debt holders when
debt holders can initiate debt renegotiation with equity holders.
Finally, conversion "in distress" causes the value of convertibles to be less affected
by the magnitude of bankruptcy costs and assets "recovery risk" than similar non-
convertible debt. This suggests that convertibles may be issued to reduce the cost of
borrowing when debt holders are asymmetrically informed about the debtor’s assets
recovery value in bankruptcy.
The paper is organised as follows. After a review of the most relevant literature,
section 2 concerns the valuation of convertible subordinated debt. The case of convert-
ible non-subordinated debt is treated as a special case. Section 3 presents the effects
of converting "in distress". Section 4 considers the case in which subordinated debt
holders can initiate debt renegotiation. The conclusions follow.
1.1 The most relevant literature
Following the seminal contribution by Black and Scholes, the modern literature on con-
vertible debt valuation starts with Ingersoll (1977) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977).
Brennan and Schwartz (1980) and Nyborg (1996) provide models for the valuation of
convertible subordinated debt, but make the restrictive assumption that senior debt must
have the same maturity as the convertible. Unlike this paper, such contributions assume
2no conversion "in distress".
Anderson, Pan and Sundaresan (1997 and 2000) (APS) value convertible non sub-
ordinated debt in the presence of bankruptcy costs and stochastic interest rates. They
assume that debt can be renegotiated and that repeated strategic debt service can take
place, highlighting that convertible holders can respond to such hostile strategic debt
service by converting. APS cannot provide closed form solutions. Instead, this pa-
per provides closed form solutions for convertible subordinated debt in the presence of
bankruptcy costs, corporate taxes and constant interest rates. Unlike in APS, this paper
analyses the valuation of convertible subordinated debt when debt renegotiation is not
possible, as may be the case for publicly held convertibles.
This paper reaches a complementary conclusion to the one in Brennan Schwartz
(1988). Brennan Schwartz suggest that convertibles may be issued to decrease the
cost of borrowing when lenders are asymmetrically informed about the debtor’s assets
volatility, since convertibles are less sensitive to assets volatility than non-convertible
debt is. Instead this paper concludes that convertibles may be issued to decrease the
cost of borrowing also when lenders are asymmetrically informed about the debtor’s
assets recovery value in bankruptcy, since convertibles that can be converted also "in
distress" are less sensitive to bankruptcy costs than non-convertible debt is.
2 CONVERTIBLE SUBORDINATED DEBT WITH
CONVERSION "IN DISTRESS"
Thissectionstudiesthevaluationofconvertiblesubordinateddebtwhendebtoranddebt
holders cannot renegotiate debt obligations in the proximity of distress. Renegotiation
maynotbepossiblebecauseofahighdegreeofasymmetricinformationbetweendebtor
and debt holders or because the ﬁrm’s debt is widely held in the public. The case of
convertible debt that is not subordinated is encompassed as a special case. The new
feature of the present analysis is that convertibles may be converted in order to avoid
costly bankruptcy and assets liquidation as the debtor approaches default. But ﬁrst
we need to introduce some assumptions and a "classic" type of convertibles valuation
model, i.e. one in which conversion takes place just when the debtor’s equity value
rises.
2.1 Assumptions and the "classic" convertible valuation model
Without much loss of generality "dynamic market completeness" is assumed. V is the
value of the ﬁrm’s assets, whose risk neutral process follows the geometric Brownian
motion
dV =( r − b) · V · dt + s · V · dz (1)
where r is the default free short rate of interest assumed constant over time, where b is
the assets pay-out ratio, where s is the volatility parameter, where dz is the differential
of a Wiener process; b and s are also assumed to be constant.
3The debtor has issued non-convertible senior debt that has value D(V,t) (t denotes
time), that as inﬁnite maturity, that continuously pays coupons at yearly rate C and that
has face value F. F and C are constant over time. D(V,t) depends on time even if it
has inﬁnite maturity because the default barrier is time-dependent.
The debtor has issued also convertible subordinated debt, whose value is SD(V,t)
and that pays a coupon ﬂow at the yearly rate SC, has face value SF and has maturity
T. SDs(V,t) denotes the value of non-convertible subordinated debt with the same
coupon, face value and maturity as SD(V,t), thus SD(V,t)=O(V,t)+SDs(V,t)
where O(V,t) is the present value of the conversion option embedded in the convert-
ible. O(V,t) is "European" in that it is assumed to be exercised just at maturity T.
tx is the corporate tax rate, K denotes ﬁxed bankruptcy costs and aV denotes pro-
portional bankruptcy costs with a constant. Following Kim-Ramaswamy-Sundaresan
(1993) and Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), default can be triggered by a liquidity
condition at tb =i n f{t<T: Vt = Vb} or at tb =i n f{t>T: Vt = V
p
b } where
V
p
b =
C (1 − tx)
b
≤ Vb =
(SC + C)(1− tx)
b
. (2)
AtmaturityT defaultoccursifVb ≤ VT ≤ VbT,w h er eVbT issuchthatE (VbT,T)=0 ,
E (V,T) denoting the value of the debtor’s equity at T. Although not a necessary as-
sumption, in what follows VbT ≥ Vb since at T the payment of the face value SF
or subordinated convertible debt falls due. This payment is usually a higher hur-
dle for the solvency of the debtor than the payment of coupons at the yearly rate
(SC + C) before T.I f Vb ≤ VT ≤ VbT default takes place and bankruptcy costs
are BC(VT,T)=m i n ( K + aVT,V T), but if default takes place at tb ≤ T, bank-
ruptcy costs are BC(Vb)=m i n( K + aVb,V b). Debt cannot be renegotiated and that
the absolute priority rule (APR) is strictly upheld in bankruptcy.
Finally, for t ≤ T equity value is E(V,t)=Tax(V,t)−BC(V,t)+V −D(V,t)−
SD(V,t),w h e r eBC(V,t) denotes the present value of expected bankruptcy costs and
Tax(V,t) denotes the present value of expected debt induced tax savings. Notice that
unlike in past analyses of subordinated convertibles (Brennan and Schwartz (1980),
Nyborg (1996)), here we do not assume that all the ﬁrm’s outstanding debt have the
same maturity as the convertible. Then, if the debtor is solvent up to T, following
Leland (1994) it can be shown that:
E(VT,T)=E (VT) − SD(VT,T) (3)
E (VT)=VT + Tax(VT) − BC(VT) − D(VT) (4)
SD(VT,T)=SF (5)
Tax(VT,T)=Tax(VT)=
C
r
tx
µ
1 −
µ
VT
V
p
b
¶q¶
(6)
4D(VT,T)=D(VT)=
C
r
+
µ
−
C
r
+m a x( m i n( F,V
p
b (1 − a) − K),0)
¶µ
VT
V
p
b
¶q
(7)
BC(VT,T)=BC(VT)=m a x( aV
p
b + K,V
p
b )
µ
VT
V
p
b
¶q
(8)
q =
−
¡
r − b − 1
2s2¢
−
q¡
r − b − 1
2s2¢2 +2 rs2
s2 .( 9 )
Moreover, if the debtor is solvent up to T, the payoff to the conversion option is
Oc (VT,T)=m a x( xE (VT) − SDs(VT,T),0) (10)
with SDs(VT,T)=SF. Oc (VT,T) speciﬁcally denotes the value of the conversion
option as per the "classic" model, ie. the option that can be exercised just when eq-
uity value increases. Thus, in the "classic" model conversion at T only occurs when
xE (VT) ≥ SF,i . e . w h e nVT ≥ VcT >V bT ≥ Vb,w h e r eVcT is the "conversion
trigger" at T such that
xE (VcT)=SF. (11)
Then, if the debtor is solvent up to T, the "classic" model implies the following payoffs
to equity holders and to convertible holders at T:
E (VT,T)=m a x( E (VT) − SF − Oc (V,T),0) (12)
SD(VT,T)=Oc (V,T)+SF. (13)
But, if the debtor is insolvent by time T, the "classic model" assumes that the re-
covery value of defaulted convertible subordinated debt is equal to the recovery value of
non-convertiblesubordinateddebt, i.e. R(V )=m i n( SF,max(V (1 − a) − K − F,0)),
because after default the APR rule is strictly applied in bankruptcy and the conversion
option becomes worthless. It follows that the "classic model" for the value of a subor-
dinated convertible SD(V,t) satisﬁes the following:
dSD(V,t)
dt
+
1
2
d2SD(V,t)
dV 2 s2V 2 +
dSD(V,t)
dV
(r − b)V − rSD(V,t)+SC =0
(14)
subject to
SD(VT,T)=
½
max(xE (VT),SF)=Oc (V,T)+SF if VT >V bT
R(VT)=m i n( SF,max(VT (1 − a) − K − F,0)) if Vb ≤ VT ≤ VbT
(15)
SD(Vb,t b)=R(Vb)=m i n( SF,max(Vb (1 − a) − K − F,0)) (16)
SD(V →∞ ,t) →∞ (17)
The model thus far is "classic": "conversion in distress" is not contemplated.
52.2 Conversion in distress
This sub-section presents the convertible valuation model with conversion "in distress".
O(V,t) denotes the value of the conversion option when conversion "in distress" is
possible. We can viewO(V,t)as thesum of (atleast) two conversion options: Oc (V,t)
to be exercised at T as in the "classic model" when the debtor’s equity value rises and
Od (V,t) to be exercised at T if missed conversion causes the debtor to default. The
payoff to the latter option is
Od (V,T)=m a x( xE (V ) − SDs(V,T),0) (18)
with SDs(V,T)=R(VT),s i n c eR(VT) is the bankruptcy recovery value of subordi-
nated debt, be it convertible or not. In other words, as the debtor approaches distress,
convertible holders can convert and keep the debtor solvent or not convert and receive
bankruptcy proceeds worth R(VT).
By converting "in distress" convertible holders get less than the face value of their
claim SF and so make a spontaneous self-interested concession to the debtor which is
not the fruit of any debt renegotiation. Convertible holders do so because, even if by
converting they avert the debtor’s default and can get xE (VT) <S F, by not converting
they let the debtor default and are bound to get even less, i.e. SD(VT,T)=R(VT) <
xE (VT).
We deﬁne VdT such that
SF ≥ SD(VdT,T)=R(VdT)=xE (VdT) > 0. (19)
Thus there can be two conversion triggers at T, namely VcT and VdT, such that
Vb ≤ VdT ≤ VbT <V cT
and such that the "classic" conversion option Oc (V,t) is exercised when VT ≥ VcT
and the conversion "in distress" option Od (V,t) when Vb ≤ VT ≤ VdT ≤ VbT.F r o m
equation 19 it follows that, ceteris paribus, the higher are the face value of senior debt
F or bankruptcy costs a and K, the higher the is VdT and the more likely conversion
"in distress" is. But VdT such that Vb ≤ VdT ≤ VbT can exist even when F =0or
a =0or K =0 . So conversion "in distress" is possible even when the convertible is
not subordinated or alternatively even when bankruptcy costs are null (but the tax shield
would still be lost in bankruptcy). Raising the percentage of equity x allotted to con-
vertible holders upon conversion makes the convertible more "equity like" because VcT
decreases, and at the same time raises VdT so as to make also conversion "in distress"
more likely.
Convertible holders may want to convert "in distress" also in case of default at tb ≤
T, withtb =i n f{t<T: Vt = Vb}, providedSD(Vb,t b)=R(Vb) <x E(Vb) <S F.
A g a i nc o n v e r s i o na ttb avoids costly assets liquidation, and it may arguably be possible
even if the conversion option is "European". Upon default at tb all debt becomes im-
mediately due and so conversion should become immediately possible, too. Even if the
6indenture of a European convertible does not explicitly contemplate conversion at tb,
such conversion is often in the interest of all claim holders. Summarising, if conversion
"in distress" is possible also at tb, we can view the value of the conversion option as the
sum of three options, i.e.
O(V,t)=Oc (V,t)+Od (V,t)+Otb (V,t) (20)
where Otb (V,t) denotes the conversion option to be exercised upon default at tb <
T. Each of these three options satisﬁes the same equation as 14 but without the in-
homogenous term SC and the respective payoffs to these options are:
Oc (V,T)=m a x( xE (V ) − SDs(V,T),0),w i t hSDs(V,T)=SF (21)
Oc (Vb,t b)=0 (22)
Oc (V →∞ ,t) → V (23)
Od (V,T)=m a x( xE (V ) − SDs(V,T),0),with SDs(V,T)=R(V ) (24)
Od (Vb,t b)=0 (25)
Od (V →∞ ,t) → 0 (26)
Otb (V,T)=0 (27)
Otb (Vb,t b)=m a x( xE (Vb) − R(Vb),0) (28)
Otb (V →∞ ,t) → 0. (29)
For completeness, when "conversion in distress" at tb or at T is possible, the payoffs
to the various claims are as follows: 
      
      
If Vb ≤ VT ≤ VdT ≤ VbT : If Vb ≤ VdT ≤ VT ≤ VbT :
E (VT,T)=E (VT)(1− x) E (VT,T)=0
Tax(VT,T)=Tax(VT) Tax(VT,T)=0
BC(VT,T)=BC(VT) BC(VT,T)=K + aVT
D(VT,T)=D(VT) D(VT,T)=m i n( F,max(VT (1 − a) − K,0))
SD(VT,T)=xE (VT).S D (VT,T)=R(VT).

      
      
If Otb (Vb,t b) > 0: If Otb (Vb,t b)=0:
E (Vb,t b)=E (Vb)(1− x) E (Vb,t b)=0 ,
Tax(Vb,t b)=Tax(Vb) Tax(Vb,t b)=0
BC(Vb,t b)=BC(Vb) BC(Vb,t b)=BC(Vb)
D(Vb,t b)=D(Vb) D(Vb,t b)=m i n( F,max(Vb (1 − a) − K,0))
SD(Vb,t b)=xE (Vb).S D (Vb,t b)=R(Vb).
.
If "conversion in distress" at T and tb is possible, the value of a subordinated con-
vertible SD(V,t) satisﬁes equation 14 subject to condition 17, to condition 30 instead
7of condition 15 and to condition 31 instead of condition 16:
SD(VT,T)=
½
max(xE (VT),SF)=Oc (V,T). + SF if VT >V bT
max(xE (V ),R(V )) if Vb ≤ VT ≤ VbT
(30)
SD(Vb,t b)=m a x( xE (Vb),R(Vb)). (31)
Then the solution to the subordinated convertible valuation model is provided in the
following:
PROPOSITION: Given the above assumptions, given that conversion at tb is possi-
ble, having deﬁned the functions
Ω(k1,k 2,k 3,w)=V k3N (k1) −
µ
V
Vb
¶−2
n(w)
w·s2
(Vb)
k3 N (k2)
d(z,w)=
wln(z)+
¡
n(w)+1
2s2w2¢
(T − t)
w · s
√
T − t
d2 (z)=
ln(z)+
¡
r − b − 1
2s2¢
(T − t)
s
√
T − t
n(w)=( r − b)w +
1
2
w(w − 1)s2
the value of convertible subordinated debt is SD(V,t)=O(V,t)+SDs(V,t), with
O(V,t)=Oc (V,t)+Otb (V,t)+Od (V,t) (32)
Oc (V,t)=Oc (V,t)+Oc (Tax(V ),t)−Oc (BC(V ),t)−Oc (D(V ),t)−Oc (SF,t)
(33)
Oc (V,t)=e−b(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VcT
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)2
VcT ·V ,1
!
,1,1
!
(34)
Oc (Tax(V ),t)=−
C
r tx
(V
p
b )
qe(−r+n(q))(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VcT
,q
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VcT ,q
!
,q,q
!
(35)
+
C
r
tx · e−r(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d2
µ
V
VcT
¶
,d 2
Ã
(Vb)2
VcT·V
!
,0,1
!
Oc (BC(V ),t)=
V
p
b · a + K
(V
p
b )
q e(−r+n(q))(T−t)·Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VcT
,q
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VcT ,q
!
,q,q
!
(36)
8Oc (D(V ),t)=
¡
−C
r +m a x( m i n( F,V
p
b (1 − a) − K),0)
¢
(V
p
b )
q e(−r+n(q))(T−t)· (37)
·Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VcT
,q
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VcT ,q
!
,q,q
!
+
C
r
e−r(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d2
µ
V
VcT
¶
,d 2
Ã
(Vb)2
VcT·V
!
,0,1
!
Oc (SF,t)=SF · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VcT
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)2
VcT·V ,1
!
,0,1
!
(38)
Otb (V,t)=m a x( xE (Vb) − max(min(SF,Vb (1 − a) − K − F),0),0)· (39)
·
µµ
V
Vb
¶q
−
1
(Vb)
qe(−r+n(q))(T−t)Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,q
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,q
¶
,q,q
¶¶
Od (E (V ),t)=Od (V,t)+Od (T (V ),t)−Od (BC(V ),t)−Od (D(V ),t)−Od (SDs (V,T),t)
(40)
Od (V,t)=e−b(T−t)
Ã
Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,1
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,1
¶
,1,1
¶
− Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VdT
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VdT ,1
!
,1,1
!!
(41)
Od (Tax(V ),t)=
C
r tx
(V
p
b )
qe(−r+n(q))(T−t)· (42)
Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VdT
,q
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VdT ,q
!
,q,q
!
− Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,q
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,q
¶
,q,q
¶
+
C
r
tx · e−r(T−t)·
Ω
µ
d2
µ
V
Vb
¶
,d 2
µ
Vb
V
¶
,0,1
¶
− Ω
Ã
d2
µ
V
VdT
¶
,d 2
Ã
(Vb)2
VdT·V
!
,0,1
!
.
Od (BC(V ),t)=
V
p
b · a + K
(V
p
p )
q e(−r+n(q))(T−t)V q· (43)
Ã
Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,q
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,q
¶
,q,q
¶
− Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VdT
,q
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VdT ,q
!
,q,q
!!
9Od (D(V ),t)=
¡
−C
r +m a x( m i n( F,V
p
b (1 − a) − K),0)
¢
(V
p
b )
q e(−r+n(q))(T−t)·
(44)
Ã
Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,q
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,q
¶
,q,q
¶
− Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VdT
,q
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·VdT ,q
!
,q,q
!!
+
C
r
e−r(T−t)
Ã
Ω
µ
d2
µ
V
Vb
¶
,d 2
µ
Vb
V
¶
,0,1
¶
− Ω
Ã
d2
µ
V
VdT
¶
,d 2
Ã
(Vb)2
VdT·V
!
,0,1
!!
Od (SDs (V,T),t)=Od (max(min(SF,VT (1 − a) − K − F),0),t)= (45)
(1 − a)e−b(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
max(VR=0,V b)
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·max(VR=0,Vb),1
!
,1,1
!
− (1 − a)e−b(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
VdT
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · VdT
,1
!
,1,1
!
+( K + F)e−r(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d2
µ
V
VdT
¶
,d 2
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · VdT
!
,0,1
!
− (K + F)e−r(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d2
µ
V
max(VR=0,V b)
¶
,d 2
Ã
(Vb)
2
V ·max(VR=0,Vb)
!
,0,1
!
10SDs(V,t)=SD(V ) (46)
−
¡
−SC
r + R(Vb)
¢
(Vb)
q e(−r+n(q))(T−t) · Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,q
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,q
¶
,q,q
¶
−
SC
r
e−r(T−t) · Ω
µ
d
µ
V
Vb
,1
¶
,d
µ
Vb
V ,1
¶
,0,1
¶
+ SF · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
min(VR=SF,V bT)
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · (min(VR=SF,V bT))
,1
!
,0,1
!
+( 1− a)e−b(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
max(VR=0,V b)
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · max(VR=0,V b)
,1
!
,1,1
!
− (K + F)e−r(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
max(VR=0,V b)
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · max(VR=0,V b)
,1
!
,0,1
!
− (1 − a)e−b(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
min(VbT,V R=SF)
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · min(VbT,V R=SF)
,1
!
,1,1
!
+( K + F)e−r(T−t) · Ω
Ã
d
µ
V
min(VbT,V R=SF)
,1
¶
,d
Ã
(Vb)
2
V · min(VbT,V R=SF)
,1
!
,0,1
!
with VR=0 such that VR=0 (1 − a)=K + F, VR=SF such that VR=SF (1 − a) −
K − F = SF and SD(V )=SC
r +
¡
−SC
r + R(Vb)
¢³
V
Vb
´q
.
See the Appendix for proof of this proposition. The proposition assumes that the
conversion option in "European", but the same formulae apply when the conversion
option is "American", the debtor distributes no dividends, Vb is exogenously set equal
to a fraction α of the face value of outstanding debt (F + SF) and the market is as-
sumed dynamically incomplete rather than complete, so that the expression (r − b) is
everywhere substituted by (m − sλ),w h e r em is the real drift of the ﬁrm’s assets value
process V and λ is the market price of V -risk.
The above proposition provides the value of the three options making up the con-
version option. Past contributions have considered just the "classic" conversion option
and neglected the conversion options to be exercised "in distress". Especially when
bankruptcy is very costly, neglecting the latter options may lead market participants to
undervalue convertibles, subordinated ones in particular.
3 THE VALUE OF CONVERSION "IN DISTRESS"
This section focuses on comparative statics for the value of the conversion "in distress"
options. Inthebasecaseconsideredhereafteraveragerealisticparametersareemployed
11and relatively high bankruptcy costs are assumed as may be speciﬁc to convertible is-
suers. Comparative statics reveal that the values of the "conversion in distress" options,
Otb (V,t) and Od (V,t), can be signiﬁcant. Figure 1 shows the value of the conversion
option with and without conversion "in distress". The prospect of converting "in dis-
tress" increases the total value of the conversion option O(V,t) even as the debtor’s
assets approach the default barrier. The reason is that the value of the conversion option
is equal to O(V,t)=Oc (V,t)+Od (V,t)+Otb (V,t) and as assets value decreases
Oc (V,t) lowers but Otb (V,t) and Od (V,t) rise because the probability of converting
"in distress" increases.
Figure 2 illustrates how the value of the convertible SD(V,t) can be signiﬁcantly
understated if conversion "in distress" is neglected, especially when the value of the
ﬁrm’s assets is low. Figure 3 shows that the sum of the conversion "in distress" options,
Od (V,t)+Otb (V,t), has a sort of bell shape for short maturities. The reason is that
the payoff to converting at maturity T is higher than the payoff to converting before
maturity at tb <T,i e .Od (V,T) ≥ Otb (Vb,t b) whenever VbT ≥ VT ≥ Vb.
The bell shape of the conversion "in distress" option (Od (V,t)+Otb (V,t))a n dt h e
"hump" of the total value of the conversion option O(V,t) imply that these options can
get less valuable as well as more valuable as assets volatility s increases. The conver-
sion "in distress" option increases in volatility when the value of the ﬁrm’s assets is far
from the default barrier, because then high volatility increases the chance of distress,
the value of equity E (V ) and the payoff to Od (V,T) > 0. But when assets value V is
near the default barrier Vb, Od (V,t) decreases in volatility, since higher volatility then
increases the probability of default before maturity, which makes Od (V,t) worthless.
It follows that also the total value of the conversion option O(V,t) does not always
increase in assets volatility even if Oc (V,t) and Otb (V,t) always do. Unlike Od (V,t),
Otb (V,t) always increases with higher assets volatility, because higher volatility in-
creases E (Vb) as well as the probability of default before maturity T.
Figure3 shows the terminal payoffs and values of theconversion"in distress" option
(Otb (V,t)+Od (V,t)) for different times to maturity. The longer is the time to the
maturity of the convertible (T −t) and the ﬂatter is the function Otb (V,t)+Od (V,t).
So, as convertible maturity gets longer, neglecting conversion "in distress" entails a less
signiﬁcantundervaluationoftheconvertibleforlowassetsvalues, butamoresigniﬁcant
one for higher assets values.
Figure 4 explains the payoffs to the conversion "in distress" options, Otb (Vb,t b)
and Od (V,T), as determined by the value of the fraction of equity xE (V ) and by the
recovery value of subordinated debt R(V ). In the base case E(VbT = 34) = SF =2 0
so, if Vb =1 5≤ VT ≤ VbT =3 4 , it follows that Od (VT,T) ≥ Otb (Vb,t b) >
0. In general a higher default barrier Vb increases the probability of default at some
tb <T,i n c r e a s e sxE (Vb) and the recovery value R(Vb) and may increase or decrease
the value of the conversion options Otb (Vb,t b) and Otb (V,t).B u t w h e n t h e l e v e l s
of outstanding senior debt and bankruptcy costs (F, a and K) are high, the recovery
value of subordinated debt may be null even for a high default barrier Vb,i nw h i c h
12case Otb (Vb,t b) and Otb (V,t) are more likely to increase in Vb. Figure 4 also implies
that, if Vb ≥ VbT, which may be the case for low b or for high C+SC
F+SF ratios, then
Od (VT,T)=0 .
The conversion "in distress" option (Otb (V,t)+Od (V,t)) often increases in value
when the debtor distributes higher payouts to security holders. Higher payouts b de-
crease equity value after conversion E (V ), increase the level of the default barrier at
maturity VbT, decrease the default barriers before and after maturity Vb and V
p
b and,
by reducing the drift of the assets value process V , increase the probability of default
when V is far from the default barriers. As b rises, Od (V,t) rises and Otb (V,t) drops,
but the rise of the ﬁrst is usually greater than the drop of the second.
The effect of leverage on the value of the conversion "in distress" options is mixed.
When ceteris paribus the face value of the convertible SF increases, the default bar-
rier at maturity VbT r i s e sa sw e l la st h ed i s t a n c e( VbT − Vb)a n dOd (V,T) becomes
more valuable. Since also the barrier before maturity Vb rises with SF, Otb (V,t) often
rises too. Instead, when ceteris paribus the face value of senior non-convertible debt
F rises, equity value after conversion E (V ) decreases and so does the recovery value
of subordinated debt in bankruptcy R(V ), while the default barriers VbT and Vb in-
crease signiﬁcantly as the coupon rate on senior non convertible debt is usually higher
the coupon on convertible debt. Generally the net effect of a rise in F is to decrease
the value of the conversion "in distress" options. When F =0the convertible is no
longer subordinated to senior debt and the payoffs Od (VT,T) and Otb (Vb,t b) can sig-
niﬁcantly increase. Thus an increase in leverage due to a rise in F generally decreases
the value of the conversion "in distress" options, while an increase in leverage due to a
rise in SF enhances the value of such options.
As for the conversion terms set in the convertible indenture, higher x,w h i c hm a k e s
theconvertiblemore"equity-like", clearlyincreasesthepayoffsOd (VT,T)andOtb (Vb,t b)
and the values of the conversion options.
3.1 Conversion "in distress" and bankruptcy costs
Intangible assets and growth opportunities can be compromised or lost in bankruptcy,
thus signiﬁcantly increasing bankruptcy costs. But Figure 4 implies that the payoffs
Od (V,T) and Otb (Vb,t b) increase with bankruptcy costs a and especially K,s i n c e
higher bankruptcy costs depress the recovery value R(V ). So, whereas bankruptcy
costs always depress the value of non convertible debt SDs (V,t), they increase the
value of the conversion "in distress" options. Hence convertible debt SD(V,t), unlike
non-convertible debt, can be partly immunised from the effect of changes in a and K .
For example in the base case the subordinated convertible is completely independent of
the magnitude of bankruptcy costs, because convertible holders would always convert
"in distress" to avert the debtor’s bankruptcy.
What above is important when lenders are asymmetrically informed about bank-
ruptcy costs and the debtor’s assets recovery value. Such asymmetric information will
13induce lenders to require higher compensation for lending. Then, especially if the bor-
rower has high default risk, it should consider issuing convertible debt instead of non-
convertible debt, since the former is less sensitive to bankruptcy costs. Convertible
debt as opposed to non-convertible debt would then make the cost of borrowing less
sensitive to uncertainty in bankruptcy costs and recovery risk and effectively decrease
the cost of borrowing when lenders are asymmetrically informed about potential bank-
ruptcy costs. Moreover, if lenders believed the recovery value of debt in bankruptcy to
be lower (higher) than the debtor’s better informed estimate, ceteris paribus the debtor
should prefer convertible (non-convertible) debt to non-convertible (convertible) debt.
Finally, since conversion "in distress" is a sort of automatic debt restructuring that
makes the bankruptcy prospect more remote and decreases expected bankruptcy costs,
issuing convertible debt as opposed to similar non-convertible debt can increase total
ﬁrm value and equity value. This increase can be signiﬁcant when the convertible is
very "equity-like" (high x ceteris paribus), when bankruptcy costs are high and debt
renegotiation to avert bankruptcy is not feasible (e.g. in the case of public debt) or is
too costly in terms of money and reputation.
Whereas Anderson-Pan-Sundaresan (2000) reached a similar conclusion for the
case in which a convertible can be renegotiated, this conclusion assumes that debt rene-
gotiation is not possible. This conclusion is also consistent with the empirical ﬁndings
of Essig (1991): convertible issuers are often characterised by high bankruptcy costs.
4 WHEN DEBT HOLDERS CAN INITIATE DEBT
RENEGOTIATION
This section highlights further differences between subordinated debt convertible "in
distress" and non non-convertible subordinated debt when some debt renegotiation can
take place. So far it has been assumed that debt renegotiation was not possible, as it
may be the case when senior and subordinated debt are publicly held securities. But
if subordinated debt holders could initiate some debt renegotiation with equity holders,
it may be objected that upon default at T or at tb holders of non-convertible subordi-
nated debt may be better off if they spontaneously offered to swap their debt claim for
equity, thus again averting immediate costly bankruptcy. For VT ≤ VbT, holders of
non-convertible subordinated debt could spontaneously offer to swap their claim into a
fraction xo of equity, where xo is chosen such that
R(VT) ≤ xoE (VT) (47)
max(V (1 − a) − K − F − SF,0) < (1 − xo)E (VT) (48)
Condition 47 guarantees that the swap be in the interest of subordinated debt hold-
ers, and condition 48 guarantees that the swap be also in the interest of equity holders
(and possibly also of senior debt holders). The actual value of xo will depend upon the
14bargaining power of equity holders and subordinated debt holders. Such swap would
avert costly bankruptcy as conversion "in distress" would, but this is not to say that
convertible and non-convertible debt are equivalent. In fact, if subordinated debt is
convertible into fraction x of equity, then xo should be such that
max(E (VT)x,R(VT)) ≤ E (VT)xo (49)
max(V (1 − a) − K − F − SF,0) − Od (V,T) < (1 − xo)E (VT) (50)
since for xo such that R(VT) <E (VT)xo ≤ E (VT)x convertible holders would
rather convert than swap, thus obtaining xE (VT) ≥ xoE (VT).S o x is like a lower
threshold for the fraction of equity which convertible holders can get by spontaneously
swapping debt for equity upon default. If subordinated debt is non-convertible, such
lower threshold is absent. In other words the conversion option can increase the bar-
gainingpowerofsubordinateddebtholders. Againequityholdersmayconcedeahigher
fraction of equity to convertible holders than contractually agreed (i.e. xo ≥ x), since
conversion "in distress" would be in the interest of both convertible holders and equity
holders. So convertible holders might bargain with equity holders over the percentage
of equity they receive upon conversion.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented new results and formulae for the valuation of convertible sub-
ordinated debt. It has been shown how it can be rational for convertible holders to
convert not only when the debtor’s equity value increases, but also when the debtor
approaches distress.
If debt cannot be renegotiated, convertible holders can make the rational and sponta-
neous concession to convert "in distress" thus averting costly liquidation of the debtor’s
assets. This concession seems important since convertibles are often publicly held
bonds, i.e. the kind of debt that is more difﬁcult to renegotiate. If debt renegotiation is
not possible and if the convertible is subordinated to other debt, convertible holders can
ﬁnd it convenient to convert "in distress" even in the absence of bankruptcy costs. The
presence of bankruptcy costs can make converting "in distress" convenient even when
the convertible is not subordinated. Since conversion "in distress" can avert immedi-
ate bankruptcy, lowers expected bankruptcy costs and increases equity value, it follows
that the choice to issue convertibles is more appealing to borrowers with high poten-
tial bankruptcy costs. This is the case even when, unlike in Anderson-Pan-Sundaresan
(2000), debt cannot be renegotiated.
Overall neglecting the conversion "in distress" option may entail a signiﬁcant un-
dervaluation of convertible debt, in particular of short maturity low grade one. Convert-
ibles most oftenarelowgrade, subordinated andunsecured debts issued bydebtors with
high bankruptcy costs: all these features contribute to make the conversion "in distress"
option more valuable. Furthermore, when subordinated debt holders can initiate debt
15renegotiation with equity holders, conversion "in distress" can increase the bargaining
power of subordinated debt holders.
Finally the conversion "in distress" option makes convertible debt less sensitive than
non-convertible debt to the recovery value of assets in bankruptcy. So convertible ﬁ-
nancing can reduce the cost of borrowing when lenders are uncertain or asymmetrically
informed about the debtor’s assets recovery value. It follows that convertibles may be
issued to reduce the cost of borrowing when lenders are uncertain about the debtor’s
assets recovery value as well as when lenders are uncertain about the debtor’s assets
volatility as suggested in Brennan and Schwartz (1988).
Future research may study optimal capital structure in the presence of convertible
subordinated debt and "conversion in distress". This may shed more light on the issue
of convertible debt design. Further research may also value convertibles assuming other
types of debt renegotiation.
Appendix A. DERIVATION OF THE PROPOSITION
FollowingLeland(1998)wecanwriteD(V )=C
r +AV q,w it hA =
¡
−c
r +( 1− a) · Vb − K
¢
·
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Using results for valuing down-and-out barrier options (see e.g. Wilmott (1998) at
page 192), the value of a claim that pays V at time T if VT ≥ VbT and if Vt ≥ Vb for
any time t<Tand that pays nothing otherwise is:
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Using the previous result, now we derive the results in Proposition I. To derive a
closed formula for Od (E (V ),t) we can write:
Od (E (V ),t)=Od (V,t)+Od (Tax(V ),t)−Od (BC(V ),t)−Od (D(V ),t)−
Od (SD(V,T),t).
Form what above, we can derive Od (V,t) as:
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Then we can derive
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Tax(V )=C
r tx
µ
1 − 1
(V
p
B)
qV q
¶
,
Q(Tax(V ),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT)=−
C
r tx
(V
p
B)
q · e(−r+n(q))(T−t)·
·
µ
V qN
³
d
³
V
Vb,q
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´−2 n
q·s2
(Vb)
q N
¡
d
¡Vb
V ,q
¢¢¶
+
+C
r tx · e−r(T−t)
µ
N
³
d
³
V
Vb,1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´1−2
r−b
s2
N
¡
d
¡Vb
V ,1
¢¢¶
,
Q(Tax(V ),t,T,V b,V dT ≤ VT)=−
C
r tx
(V
p
B)
q · e(−r+n(q))(T−t)·
·
µ
V qN
³
d
³
V
VdT ,q
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´−2 n
q·s2
(Vb)
q N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·VdT ,q
´´¶
+
+C
r tx · e−r(T−t)
µ
N
³
d
³
V
VdT ,1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´1−2
r−b
s2
N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·VdT ,1
´´¶
.
Then we can derive
Od (D(V ),t)=Q(D(V ),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT) − Q(D(V ),t,T,V b,V dT ≤ VT),
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Then we can derive
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Then we can derive
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In a similar way it is possible to derive Oc (E (V ),t) as:
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In a similar way we can derive also:
Otb (V,t)=Otb (V ) − Q(Otb (V ),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT),
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The above gives us the formula for the total value of the conversion option since
O(V,t)=Oc (V,t)+Otb (V,t)+Od (V,t).
Then, the value of subordinated debt can be shown to be SD(V,t)=SDs(V,t)+
O(V,t),w h e r eSDs(V,t) is the value of non-convertible debt.
AsinMella-BarralandTychon(1999), itcanbeshownthatSDs (V,t)=SDs (V )−
Q(SDs (V ),t,V b,V bT,T),s ot h a t :
SDs(V,t)=SD(V )−Q(SD(V ),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT)+Q(SF,t,T,V b,V bT ≤ VT)
+Q(max(min(SF,VT (1 − a) − K − F),0),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT ≤ VbT),
with SD(V )=SC
r +
¡
−SC
r +m a x( m i n( SF,Vb (1 − a) − K − F),0)
¢³
V
Vb
´q
.
19SettingVR=0 suchthatVR=0 (1 − a)=K+F,an dVR=SF suchthatVR=SF (1 − a)−
K − F = SF,t h e nw h e nVb ≤ VT ≤ VbT:
max(min(SF,VT (1 − a) − K − F),0) =

  
  
= SF if VbT ≥ VT ≥ VR=SF;
=( VT (1 − a) − K − F) ≥ 0
if min(VbT,V R=SF) ≥ VT ≥ max(VR=0,V b);
=0if VR=0 ≥ VT ≥ Vb.
.
Thus
Q(max(min(SF,VT (1 − a) − K − F),0),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT ≤ VbT)=
Q(VT (1 − a) − K − F,t,T,Vb,max(VR=0,V b) ≤ VT)+
−Q(VT (1 − a) − K − F,t,T,Vb,min(VbT,V R=SF) ≤ VT)
+[Q(SF,t,T,V b,V R=SF ≤ VT) − Q(SF,t,T,V b,V bT ≤ VT)]; theterminbrack-
ets is necessary only if VbT ≥ VR=SF, which is not usually the case in practice. It
follows that:
SDs(V,t)=SD(V )−Q(SD(V ),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT)+Q(SF,t,T,V b,min(VR=SF,V bT) ≤ VT)
+Q(VT (1 − a) − K − F,t,T,Vb,max(VR=0,V b) ≤ VT)+
−Q(VT (1 − a) − K − F,t,T,Vb,min(VbT,V R=SF) ≤ VT),
Q(SD(V ),t,T,V b,V b ≤ VT)=
(− SC
r +max(min(SF,Vb(1−a)−K−F),0))
(Vb)q e(−r+n(q))(T−t)·
·
Ã
V qN
³
d
³
V
Vb,q
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´−2
n(q)
q·s2
(Vb)
q N
¡
d
¡Vb
V ,q
¢¢
!
+SC
r e−r(T−t)
µ
N
³
d
³
V
Vb,1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´1−2
r−b
s2
N
¡
d
¡Vb
V ,1
¢¢¶
,
Q(SF,t,T,V b,min(VR=SF,V bT) ≤ VT)=
SFe−r(T−t)
µ
N
³
d
³
V
min(VR=SF,VbT),1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´1−2
r−b
s2
N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·min(VR=SF,VbT),1
´´¶
,
Q(VT (1 − a) − K − F,t,T,Vb,max(VR=0,V b) ≤ VT)=
e−b(T−t) (1 − a)
µ
VN
³
d
³
V
max(VR=0,Vb),1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´−2
r−b
s2
(Vb)N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·max(VR=0,Vb),1
´´¶
−(K + F)e−r(T−t)
µ
N
³
d
³
V
max(VR=0,Vb),1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´1−2
r−b
s2
N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·max(VR=0,Vb),1
´´¶
,
Q(VT (1 − a) − K − F,t,T,Vb,min(VbT,V R=SF) ≤ VT)=
e−b(T−t) (1 − a)
µ
VN
³
d
³
V
min(VbT,VR=SF),1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´−2
r−b
s2
(Vb)N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·min(VbT,VR=SF),1
´´¶
−(K + F)e−r(T−t)
µ
N
³
d
³
V
min(VbT,VR=SF),1
´´
−
³
V
Vb
´1−2
r−b
s2
N
³
d
³
(Vb)2
V ·min(VbT,VR=SF),1
´´¶
.
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Figure 1: The value of the conversion option with and without "conversion in distress"
assuming debt renegotiation is not possible. Base case parameters: b =0 .06, s =0 .2,
r =0 .04, x =0 .35, K =0 , a =0 .3, SC =0 .02 · SF, C =0 .05 · F, SF =2 0 ,
F =2 0 , T − t =5 , tx =0 .35.
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Figure 2: Values and payoff to the convertible in the base case when debt cannot be
renegotiated and with or without "conversion in distress"
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Figure 3: Payoff and values of the conversion "in distress" option
O(V,t) − Oc (V,t)=Od (V,t)+Otb (V,t) as a function of time to the matu-
rity of the convertible (T − t).
25-
5
10
15
20
25
30
V
 18 
 22 
 26 
 30 
 34 
 38 
 42 
 46 
 50 
 54 
 58 
 62 
 66 
 70 
 74 
 78 
 82 
 86 
 90 
x E(V)
R(V)
SF
Figure 4: Determinants of the payoffs to the conversion "in distress" options: the frac-
tion of equity xE (V ) received upon conversion can be higher than the recovery value
of subordinated debt in bankruptcy R(V ).
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